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TOWARD A RESTATEMENT OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
William F. Swindler*
The attitude of the courts and the practitioners is in a state of change,
recogniziig instances where group-practice is necessary and proper. Pro-
fessor Swindler asserts that the Canons of Ethics must be revised to indi-
cate the acceptance by the legal profession of such group-practice, partic-
ularly if the indigent and low-income client is to be served properly.
Suggested revisions to the applicable Canons reflect the author's opinion.
I. A CHANGING CONTEXT OVER SIXTY YEARS
N August 1964 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion appointed a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Stan-
dards to study the current state of professional practice with reference
to "the adequacy and effectiveness of the present Canons of Professional
Ethics," and "to make recommendations for changes it deems appro-
priate to encourage and maintain the highest level of professional stan-
dards by our profession."' The incoming ABA President, Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., pointed out the problem:
Many aspects of the practice of law have changed significantly
since 1908. When the original canons were framed, the typical
lawyer was a general practitioner, usually alone, who divided his
time between the courts and a family-lawyer office practice. There
were few large law firms, few corporate legal departments and few
lawyers working for government. There was virtually no adminis-
trative law; no income tax law; no great body of corporate law
practice; and little specialization in the practice. The flood of tort
litigation was yet to come.2
Thus, as the Special Committee continues its assigned study,3 a long-
overdue dialogue has developed on the matter of professional ethics-
* A.B., B.S., Washington University; M.A., Ph.D., University of Missouri; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Nebraska. Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
& Mary.
1. Powell, The President's Page, 50 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1964). The committee mentioned
has the benefit of extended studies by a Special Committee on Canons of Ethics of the
American Bar Foundation, made several years before. See Report of the Special Com-
mittee on Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Foundation (Chicago, 1958).
2. Powell, supra note 1, at 1005. See also 9 A.B.A. NEws 1 (Sept. 15, 1964); 10 A.B.A.
NEws 4 (Jan. 15, 1965).
3. See the progress report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards
to the 1965 ABA convention, digested in 51 A.B.A.J. (1965). See also REPORT OF THE
JOINT CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmmrrY (Chicago, 1958). The Joint Conference
was established in 1952 by the Association of American Law Schools and the American
Bar Association.
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or, as the more modern and inclusive expression has it, professional
responsibility. The first thirty-two Canons were adopted almost sixty
years ago, in 1908, and the only substantial addition, that of thirteen
new Canons, occurred in 1928. Canon 47, the latest to be adopted, dates
from 1937. Although there have been periodic amendments up to the
present, these amendments are manifestly limited to the scope of the
subject matter in the Canons themselves. Thus the content and thrust
of the Canons is as significant as the time-lag suggested by the foregoing
chronology.
A somewhat arbitrary classification of the present Canons shows eight
broad categories: 4 (1) general attorney-court relationships; 5 (2) general
attorney-client relationships; 6 (3) relations with other parties, essen-
tially in a courtroom context; 7 (4) standards of conduct during a trial;8
(5) elementary fiduciary principles; 9 (6) details as to fees and expenses;'10
(7) the highly sensitive areas of associates, intermediaries, specialization
and the like;1 and (8) a number of generalized statements of profes-
sional principles.' 2 Such a classification tends to confirm the fact that
the Canons were, and increasingly have become, retrospective-pre-
serving a Victorian aura of trial practice as the paramount and often
exclusive concern of the average attorney, or at least as the area in
which most of his ethical problems and questions of public responsi-
bility will be raised.' 3
To state this fact is also to declare that the Canons need to be sup-
plemented and/or revised to take into account the changes wrought in
the profession in the past six decades and suggested in Powell's admo-
nition.' 4 The last substantial supplementing of the Canons was prior
to the period when the administrative process through the regulatory
agencies, particularly those of the federal government, began its pro-
4. See Swindler, Ethics in Legal Practice in Nebraska: A Comparative Analysis, 37
NEB. L. Ray. 703, 705-07 (1958).
5. American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canons 1-5 [hereinafter
cited and referred to as ABA Canon (and the particular number)].
6. ABA Canons 6-8, 15, 16, 19, 37.
7. ABA Canons 9, 17, 18, 39.
8. ABA Canons 20-26.
9. ABA Canons 11, 38.
10. ABA Canons 12-14, 42.
11. ABA Canons 27, 33-35, 43, 45-47.
12. ABA Canons 10, 28-32, 40, 44.
13. For example, the GUIDES TO PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE NEW CALIFORNIA PRAC-
TITIONER (1961), published by the Board of Governors of the California State Bar Associ-
ation and the Conference of Barristers of the State of California, recapitulates the basic
canons on solicitation, fees and duties to clients and courts. A slightly broader statement
is found in the excellent handbook of the Illinois bar, TRAICOFF, YOU AND YOUR PRO-
FESSION: A HANDBOOK ON ETHICS FOR ILLINOIS LAWYERS (1959).
14. See text at note 2 supra.
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liferation. The middle third of the twentieth century has also been
marked not only by a substantially greater emphasis upon a lawyer's
office practice in proportion to his trial work, but also by a fundamen-
tal change in the character of this practice. A high technical compe-
tence in tax law and analogous accounting procedures is only the most
obvious of a long list of skills demanded of the modem practitioner
which have (or at least he and his client hope will have) little or no
relationship to forensic tactics. Aside from the problems of specializa-
tion or interprofessional collaboration which these facts suggest, there
are finally the corollary problems bred by the always accelerating out-
put of technical knowledge, in both social and natural sciences, which
so frequently demand consideration and application in complex legal
questions.15
Even in the traditional areas of legal practice, the practice has not stood
still. In 1956 the American College of Trial Lawyers adopted a Code
of Trial Conduct which, as the preamble itself stated, was found neces-
sary "not to supplant, but to supplement and stress certain portions of
the Canons of Professional Ethics."'16 That document, as adopted, con-
tained twenty-eight clauses which the sponsors considered necessary to
bring up to date the ABA Canons, then half a century old.' 7 Fifteen
years before this, the New York County Criminal Courts Bar Associa-
tion had drawn up a special Code of Ethics for the Prosecution and
Defense of Criminal Cases, the first of its kind to attempt to inject
more meaningful principles into the genteel tradition of Canon 5.18
15. In the Preface to FREEMAN, LEGAL COUNSELING AND INTERVIEWING (1964) at page x,
Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard Law School stated: "Whole areas of the law never
get into court. An example may be found in the problems of legal ethics which are
considered frequently in every busy law office, but which are resolved by the partners
without any court decision. And much business advice consists of caution and forewarn-
ing, designed, and usually effectively, to keep the business out of court." See also Free-
man, The Role of Lawyers as Counselors, 7 W. & M. L. Rv. 203 (1966).
16. American College of Trial Lawyers, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCt 1 (rev. ed. 1963). See
also the statement by the author of the Code, indicating that it was made necessary by
the fact that the ABA Canons were "lacking in clarity, or ambiguous and grammatically
confusing" due to their piecemeal interpretation and amendment over the years in an
attempt to cover changing conditions. Welpton, Code of Trial Conduct, 12 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 464, 465 (1961).
17. Compare the wording of Canons 1 & 2 of the Code of Trial Conduct, "Employment
in Civil Cases," & "Continuance of Employment in and Conduct of Civil Cases," with
ABA Canons 8, 31 & 44; Canons 3 & 4 of the Code of Trial Conduct, on criminal cases,
with ABA Canon 5; Canon 5 of the Code of Trial Conduct, "Conflicting Interests and the
Confidences of a Client," with ABA Canons 6 & 37; and, see generally, the more detailed
formulae in the Code of Trial Conduct set out in Canons analogous to ABA Canons 7,
9, 17, 18, 20, and 23.
With reference to another set of explicit guidelines for courtroom condqct see Chris-
tenson, Courtroom Decorum as an Aid to Proper Judicial Administration, 27 F.R.D. 445
(1961).
18. The Code of Ethics for the Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Cases contains
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It has been-in the newer areas of professional activity, however, that
the static condition of legal ethics has been most acutely discernible.
The vast expansion of administrative law, and the lethargic response
of the organized bar to the manifest need for a corresponding expan-
sion of the Canons to accommodate the new responsibilities developing
therewith, led to the drafting of their own ethical codes by certain of
the agencies themselves-the Interstate Commerce Commission Gen-
eral Rules of Practice being the most striking example.19 Even this
eventuality, however, did not notably accelerate the response of the
profession itself.20 In the decade since the ICC code was promulgated,
the chief concern of the organized bar vis-t-vis governmental agencies
has been to control and minimize, if it cannot altogether eliminate, the
function of the non-lawyer in practice before these agencies. 21
Of more concern to the bar, economically and professionally, has
been the matter of unauthorized practice of law by members of other
professional groups which have developed in the past thirty years. The
ABA House of Delegates at its meeting in January 1940 inaugurated a
program of endeavoring through full disclosure of unauthorized prac-
tice problems to secure wherever possible the cooperation of national
associations of laymen and acceptance of principles relating thereto.
This led to a series of agreements with trust officers of banks, insurance
adjusters, realtors, life insurance underwriters, accountants, and collec-
tion agencies in the course of the next two decades. Discussions are
currently in progress with casualty insurance companies and social
workers' groups.22 In the important field of labor arbitration a code
twenty-five canons, as compared with ABA Canons 4 & 5 which deal specifically with
persons accused of crime. The reprint of the text of the New York County Criminal Courts
Bar Association Code appears in 8 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 80 (1942).
19. ICC, General Rules of Practice, 20 FaD. REG. Part V, Nos. 192-212 (Oct. 1955). See
also U.S. Patent Office, Ru..Es OF PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES (1965), especially Rules 341-48;
TRADE MARK RuLEs or PRACTICE OF THE PATENT OFFICE (1963), especially Rules 2.11-.17.
For another interesting aspect see the report of the Administrative Law Section of the
Bar Association of the District of Columbia in its proposed code of ethics for adminis-
trative agencies. Deale, Ethics and the Administrative Process, 25 J.B.A.D.C. 570, 571
(1958).
20. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); State ex rel.
State Bar v. Keller, 21 Wis. 2d 100, 123 N.W.2d 905 (1963).
21. The major objectives of the American Bar Association were embodied in the bill
which ultimately became the Federal Administrative Practice Reorganization Act of 1965,
79 Stat. 1281, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1013 (1965). See also Deale, supra note 19; Symposium, The
Practice of Non-Lawyers Before Administrative Agencies, 15 FED. B.J. 99 (1955).
22. See, e.g., Statement of Principles with Respect to the Practice of Law Formulated
by Representatives of the American Bar Association and Various Business and Profes-
sional Groups, 89 A.B.A. REP. App. 85 (1964). See also Chicago Bar Ass'n, STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE GOVERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAWYERS AND PHYSICIANS (1960).
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has been drafted by the American Arbitration Association and the
National Academy of Arbitrators.23
Adding to the complexity of, as well as further emphasizing the
need for, a revision and modernization of the code of legal ethics are
at least three other considerations. First, and probably hardest to assess,
is the extent and effect of changing public and professional attitudes
toward socio-economic-legal issues (e.g., divorce counseling, client se-
curity funds, "annual legal checkups," and the like). As a traditionally
conservative institution, the legal profession has reacted slowly to these
issues and attitudes. Yet times do change, and the profession ultimately
is compelled to face up to the fact that it has no choice but to adjust
its own position to take these changes into account. For too long the
bench and bar, for example, have continued to treat domestic relations
issues in the context of a vanished society rather than as prime ingre-
dients in the current process of social ferment.24 The ancient concept
of virtually all legal proceedings being adversary proceedings has obvi-
ously militated against the acceptance of many features of modem
counseling which must be based upon a premise that the counselor
(e.g., the lawyer) will sooner or later need to bring the parties together
in an attempt to work out their problems.2 5 The steady development
of a corporately organized society replacing the individualistic orienta-
tion of the nineteenth century has required-but has not yet achieved
-a reorientation of the lawyer-client relationship.
The second problem is the related fact that the nineteenth-century
frame of reference for the codes of professional conduct has been crys-
tallized into statute law in many jurisdictions.26 While, theoretically,
the job of amending or repealing such legislative enactments is not
overly-difficult, in reality the psychological barricade against change is
formidable. The pro forma apostrophe to a virtuous past threatened
with desecration by a contemporary revisionism is a standard and al-
most predictable reaction by provincial lawmakers, whether the subject
be fluoridation, modernization of divorce laws, or standardized daylight
saving time. It is one thing, therefore, to propose a general restatement
of professional responsibility and another to reconcile it (i.e., by repeal
of obsolescent statutes) with the cultural lag of most legislation.
23. American Arbitration Ass'n and Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, CODE oF ETHIcs AND
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR LAIOR-MANAGEMENT ARBrrRATiON (1964).
24. See, e.g., Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litigation, 66
HARv. L. REv. 443 (1953); Harper & Harper, Lawyers and Marriage Counseling, 1 J. FAM.
L. 73 (1961). See also Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
25. But see A.B.A. Informal Opinion C-524; Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964).
26. Brand, BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES: ORGANIZATION, ETHICS AND DIsci-
PLINE passim (1956).
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The third problem is perhaps first in magnitude-in any event, the
main portions of the present article are addressed to it. This problem
is epitomized in the trends of adjudication in several subject-areas
which directly (as in the case 27 discussed in Part II) or indirectly (as in
the circumstances reviewed in Part III) affect the postulates of profes-
sional conduct. The group as the client in place of the individual28 is
a characteristic of the process of transition to the corporate organiza-
tion of society referred to above, and the handwriting on the wall is
already discernible: the legal profession is going to have to take this
fact of modern life into account.29 Conversely, the more zealous effort
to preserve the individual's personal rights and liberties in this ever
more closely organized society30 represents the other side of the coin.
When the tumult and the shouting die, or in other words when the
restatement of professional ethics has been effectuated, the fact will
remain that these judicial trends-shunting the profession toward ac-
commodation of the new corporate social order and at the same time
charging it with much greater responsibilities in the defense of indi-
vidual rights-represent the force and counterforce which provide such
equilibrium as can exist in the sixth decade of our fast-moving century.
II. THE Brotherhood CASE AND CANONS 35 AND 47
Canon 35 is one of the more "recent" Canons; i.e., it was among the
group added during the comprehensive enlargement of the original list
at the American Bar Association convention in 1928. Canon 47 is the
most "recent," having been adopted in 1937. The groundwork for
Canon 35 apparently was laid three years earlier when the ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics and Grievances delivered an advisory
opinion condemning the acceptance by lawyers of employment by an
automobile club under circumstances permitting the club to profit
from the lawyers' professional services.31 This opinion relied on more
than a dozen judicial decisions in point, as well as on Canons 27 and
28, but the special committee of the ABA appointed that year to draft
supplementary Canons, gave particular attention to the problems of
fee-splitting and intermediaries and, in its report four years later, pro-
27. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
28. This is the crux of the Brotherhood case.
29. See Symposium, Group Legal Services In Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 279 (1965).
30. This zealous effort underlies the rationale of the indigent accused's right to counsel,
treated in part II infra.
31. A.B.A. Opinion 8 (1925).
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posed the related Canons 34 and 35 which, after considerable discus-
sion on the floor, were eventually adopted.3 2
For the ensuing quarter of a century, case law and advisory opinions
consistently held to the propositions set out in these Canons: "The
professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervene between cli-
ent and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are indi-
vidual."3 3 "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his
name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized prac-
tice of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate."3 4 In People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club,3 5 an auto club was the spe-
cific target of adjudication, and there was general agreement with the
observation of the Illinois Supreme Court that where the auto club is
organized for the purpose of rendering service to motorists for a stipu-
lated membership fee, hires lawyers and has a regular staff of attorneys
who defend motorists, paying for such services out of fees received with-
out any further charge to parties in such suits, it must be held to be in
the business of practicing law for its members. Subsequently, the ban
was extended readily to other groups. In 1937 the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar
Ass'n,36 held improper the practice of credit men who solicited. liqui-
dated commercial accounts for collection and when the association
needed the services of a lawyer, selected him, made contact with him
and employed him as agent for the creditor, although the creditor him-
self often did not even know who the attorney was. Under such circum-
stances, said the court, "while technically the relation of attorney and
client is established between the lawyer and the creditor ... the asso-
ciation is the ... real client" and "its business [was that] of supplying
for a consideration to others the legal services of lawyers ....3
The consistency of judicial posture in this area was assumed to be
further established by somewhat analogous cases relating to other pro-
fessions which came before the Supreme Court of the United States.
32. 53 A.B.A. REP. 117 (1928). The sensitivity of the subjects is reflected in the amend-
ments to both Canons 34 and 35 adopted in 1933, exempting "the established custom of
receiving commercial collections through a lay agency." See discussion at 58 A.B.A. REP.
428 (1933). In 1937, Canon 34 was rendered more stringent by striking the permissive
clause on forwarding fees involving a non-lawyer. See discussion at 62 A.B.A. Ra. 350
(1937).
33. ABA Canon 35.
34. ABA Canon 47.
35. 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935).
36. 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937).
37. Id. at 341, 189 S.E. at 160.
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Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners38 involved an Oregon
statute aimed at controlling advertising by dental practitioners, the
Court finding that it was within the authority of the state to estimate
the effects of dental advertising and to protect the community not only
against deception but against practices which, though they be free from
deception in particular instances, tend nevertheless to lower the stan-
dards of the profession and demoralize it. Another case 39 involved an
Oklahoma statute which undertook to prohibit optometric services ex-
cept by licensed practitioners, and the United States Supreme Court
found that this did not fall within any prohibitions of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
There was, however, one sign of impending change which was re-
flected in a dissent in a California case40 where lawyers acting-strik-
ingly enough-for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen were cen-
sured by the majority for permitting their professional services to be
"channeled" by the union "contrary to professional standards." Justices
Carter and Traynor dissented with the argument that the plan "in no
way lowers the dignity of the profession." 41 Justice Carter opined that
it was "nothing more than a proper joining of forces for the accomplish-
ment of a proper legal objective of mutual protection."42 He stated
further that it was not a case "where the purpose, motive and result is
stirring up or exciting litigation, '43 but one where "the essential ob-
jective of the instant plan is not to obtain clients for any attorney. It is
to enable the organization [the Brotherhood] to assist its members in
a matter of vital concern to them. '44
Buttressing the judicial position were the advisory opinions of state
and national bar associations. ABA members were admonished not to
permit banks to list their names in advertisements announcing the
banks' will-drafting services,45 or otherwise to cooperate with a trust
company or like institution in furtherance of its unauthorized practice
of law.40 The Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Virginia
State Bar condemned a plan whereby a corporation paid an attorney to
come to its office periodically to advise its employees on legal matters
and draw up simple instruments-an arrangement which was held to
38. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
39. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
40. Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
41. Id. at 527, 225 P.2d at 522.
42. Id. at 515, 225 P.2d at 515.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 517, 225 P.2d at 516.
45. A.B.A. Opinion 41 (1931).
46. A.B.A. Opinion 122 (1934).
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violate both the Canons and the rule of the Richmond Ass'n of Credit
Men case.47
Rather ironically, it was the social revolution bred by Brown v.
Board of Education4s which prepared the way for the eventual judicial
overthrow of this long-entrenched professional position. In the effort
to facilitate the "reasonable expedition" of desegregation of public
schools, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People encouraged its state and local branches to alert their member-
ship to the legal and constitutional issues involved therein. The Vir-
ginia State Conference of NAACP Branches specifically encouraged
local branches to invite a member of the Conference legal staff to ad-
dress a meeting of parents and children and explain the legal steps
necessary to achieve desegregation. The staff member brought with him
printed forms authorizing him or other lawyers retained by the Con-
ference or by the national NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund to represent the signers in desegregation litigation. In 1956 the
Virginia General Assembly undertook to broaden its statutory prohibi-
tions against solicitation of legal business by including these specific
practices within its definition of "running" and "capping," 49 and in
due course the state supreme court of appeals, in NAACP v. Harrison,50
ruled that the NAACP activities violated both the statute and Canons
35 and 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
The Supreme Court of the United States, with five Justices in sup-
port and Mr. Justice White concurring in part, reversed the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.51 In a portentous pronouncement, Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan stated in the majority opinion that under the guise of
legislation against solicitation
a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by
mere labels .... In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation
is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means
for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all
government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro
community of this country.52
The opinion went on to declare that "the State's attempt to equate the
47. VA. STATE BAR OPINIONS, Opinion 10 [1947] (1965).
48. 347 U.S. 488 (1954). A subsequent opinion in the Brown case is found at 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
49. VA. CODE §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (Supp. 1964). These sections were amended in 1956
by the Extra Session, c. 88. There was a subsequent amendment to sections 54-74 and
54-78 in 1964, and in that year section 54-79 was rewritten.
50. 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960).
51. NAACP v. Button, 871 U.S. 415 (1968).
52. Id. at 429.
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activities of the NAACP and its lawyers with common-law barratry,
maintenance and champerty, and to outlaw them accordingly," 53 was
an improper encroachment upon the protected freedom of expression
asserted in the first amendment and extended to the states by the four-
teenth.
However valid may be Virginia's interest in regulating the tradi-
tionally illegal practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty,
that interest does not justify the prohibition of the NAACP activi-
ties disclosed in this record. Malicious intent was of the essense of
the common-law offenses of fomenting or stirring up litigation.
And whatever may be or may have been true of suits against
government in other countries, the exercise in our own, as in
this case, of First Amendment rights to enforce constitutional
rights through litigation, as a matter of law, cannot be deemed
malicious.5 4
The decision in NAACP v. Button55 thus rested exclusively upon
the constitutional issues involved, but it made all but inevitable the
judicial review of group legal practices in general on the same consti-
tutional propositions. Fifteen months after Button, in January 1963,
came the six-to-two majority opinion in Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar5" in April 1964.
In 1958 the Supreme Court of Illinois in a declaratory judgment had
condemned as illegal and unprofessional the practice of the Brother-
hood of fee splitting between the union and its regional counsel in
prosecuting injury claims of union members, presenting blank employ-
ment contracts to prospective claimants and compensating investiga-
tors in injury cases. 57 The Brotherhood discontinued these practices
and reorganized its legal services for its members by April 1959, and
set up these facts in its answer to a complaint filed on behalf of the
Virginia State Bar in June 1959. The complainant, however, insisted
that the continuance of the Brotherhood's legal counseling services to
injured members constituted a solicitation of legal business and the
unauthorized practice of law, and in January 1962 the chancery court
awarded an injunction. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia re-
fused an appeal and supersedeas in June and denied a petition for re-
hearing in August 1962. Having thus exhausted its local remedies the
Brotherhood thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
53. Id. at 438.
54. Id. at 439-40.
55. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
56. 377 U.S. 1 (1964), 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 142.
57. In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
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States for a writ of certiorari, noting that NAACP v. Button was by
then before the Court, and relying upon the first and fourteenth
amendments to the federal Constitution and the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Black noted that
certiorari had been granted "to consider this constitutional question
in the light of" the rule handed down in the NAACP case.58 Extending
the constitutional protection to the Brotherhood, the majority opinion
held that "what Virginia has sought to halt is not a commercialization
of the legal profession which might threaten the moral and ethical
fabric of the administration of justice .... The railroad workers, by
recommending competent lawyers to each other, obviously are not
themselves engaging in the practice of law, nor are they or the lawyers
whom they select parties to any soliciting of business." 5 In dissent, Mr.
Justice Clark protested the unreality of the majority view in the light
of "the accepted ethics of the profession and the statutory and judicial
rules of acceptable conduct,"6 0 as well as the continuing disciplinary
actions directed at the union procedure.61
Sharing Justice Clark's concern over the consequences of the decision
and considering "the alleged uncertainty or misconception of the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Black," the Richmond Chancery Court on remand
reviewed the transcript of the original proceedings, as well as the Black
opinion, and concluded that the latter "referred to and approved only
advice and recommendation" and "does not approve of unauthorized
law practice." "With all due deference," the Chancellor continued, "it
must be stated that Virginia does not attempt in this suit to prevent
'recommendation' and that the injunction of this court did not apply
to 'recommendation,' but to unethical solicitation and the unautho-
rized practice of law." Thereupon the chancery court issued a perma-
nent injunction as its final order, reiterating in terms the basic stip-
ulated restraints in its decree of January 1962, but providing that
"nothing herein contained shall be construed to infringe upon or re-
strict the constitutional rights of the defendant . . . to advise the
defendant's members or their families or others, to obtain legal advice
.. and to recommend a specific lawyer or lawyers to give such advice
or handle such claims; provided, however, that the circumstances of
such advice and recommendation shall not constitute or amount to the
58. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex -el. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
59. Id. at 6-7.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id. at 11 n.2.
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solicitation of legal employment for or on behalf of any lawyer or
lawyers." 2
The final order thus seeking to confine the effects of the Supreme
Court opinion to the narrowest possible area and to salvage and pre-
serve the greatest possible portion of the bar's traditional position re-
flects the attitude of the organized profession in general.63 Counterbal-
ancing this position, however, are three sets of facts of an ascending
order of importance: first, the likelihood that the injunction will sim-
ply breed a new suit seeking to nullify its effect in Virginia; second,
the evidence that in other jurisdictions the courts will follow the rule
set out in the Supreme Court opinion and enlarge upon it gratuitously
until the proposition reflected in the Richmond Chancery Court's
order becomes all but moot;64 and third, the accelerating trend toward
group-sponsored services in many fields other than, as well as including,
law that underlines ever more emphatically that circumstances them-
selves will compel a change in the concepts of "unauthorized" practice
of law. (Activity which is "unauthorized" may nevertheless be the prac-
tice of law by competent lawyers; the question becomes essentially,
what is "authorized" and who shall "authorize" it-the bar in the in-
terest of a traditional orientation of its position, or society in the in-
terest of its contemporary needs?)
The legal profession itself has not been unanimous in its opposition
to group practice. More than thirty years ago a writer raised the ques-
tion:
Why is it that individuals may band together to provide them-
selves with cheaper insurance, cheaper groceries, higher wages,
better prices, easier credit, lower taxes, better health-everything,
except better or cheaper legal advice and aid? Why is it that tax-
payers, though they may organize for their mutual protection, may
not retain a lawyer in their corporate name to handle their indi-
vidual tax suits?
The real objection to corporations practicing law is that it is
against public policy. Conceding that this is correct as to corpora-
62. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Final Order and
Opinion (Ch. Ct. of Richmond, Va. Jan. 15, 1965).
63. See, e.g., the statement of the American Bar Association following the denial by
the Supreme Court of a request for a rehearing:
In spite of all this, the organized bar ... firmly supports the Canons of Professional
Ethics in their present form; and that each State and Local Bar Association should
advise its Membership that, so far as the conduct of individual Lawyers is con-
cerned, this Decision is not a "License to Solicit" and that Soliciting or any other
violation of the Canons will, as before, result in disciplinary action. 30 UNAUTH.
PRAC. NmWs 114-15 (1964).
64. See, e.g., State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 374 Mich. 152, 132 N.W.2d 78
(1965); Ryan v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 396 P.2d 113 (Mont. 1964).
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tions seeking to engage in the "law business," it is submitted...
that incorporated associations organized not for profit are entirely
different in their nature, and in many cases perform a valuable
public service of which the public should not have been deprived
by the action of the court.65
Twenty years later, no less a person than the then chairman of the ABA
Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, himself a
distinguished practitioner, commented in the same general vein:
Where . . . the corporation or association employs and pays
the lawyer to advise and represent its employees, patrons, or mem-
bers in respect to their individual affairs, the prohibition of the
Canon [35] is directly applicable, even though the lawyer's rela-
tion is direct, although there is no conflict of interest between the
client and the organization, and even though the reason and occa-
sion for the service is the bona fide interest of the organization to
see that it is performed. This latter consideration is particularly
forcible in the case of corporations whose direct interest, as an en-
tity, is to see that their employees are kept free from legal difficul-
ties and entanglements. Business corporations may and do to an
ever increasing extent provide free medical services for their em-
ployees, as one of their conditions of employment, in order to
keep them healthy, and consequently more efficient. Why not sim-
ilarly free legal service and advice? 6
It is not believed that the Canon will prevent the labor unions
from finding lawyers to advise their members. The whole modem
tendency is in favor of such arrangements, including particularly
employer and cooperative health services, the principles of which,
if applied to legal services would materially lower and spread the
total cost to the lower income groups. The real argument against
their approval by the bar is believed to be loss of income to the
lawyers and concentration of service in hands of fewer lawyers.
These features do not commend the profession to the public. 67
Most recent and most eloquent of all has been the commentary stimu-
lated by the Progress Report of the Committee on Group Legal Ser-
vices of the California Bar Association. In the sympathetic aura of the
dissents of Justices Carter and Traynor in Hildebrand v. State Bar,68
the committee has raised the ultimate question, implicit in the
passages from Weihofen and Drinker quoted above, of whether (or,
65. Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility, 2 U.
CHi. L. RFv. 119, 128-29 (1934).
66. DruiNKER, LEGAL ETHICS 162-63 (1953).
67. Id. at 167.
68. 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
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rather, when and how) there should not be a new rationale of profes-
sional ethics in this matter. 9
One is reminded of another observation by Weihofen made just
thirty years ago. Commenting on a then recent Illinois case, 70 directed
against legal services by automobile clubs, in the ABA Opinion 8 and
the 1928 Canon 35, the author said:
The anthropologists have shown that ethical and moral values
vary from time to time and from place to place. There is nothing
so heinous but that it has been considered proper and even oblig-
atory for moral standing in some ethnic group. And, conversely,
there is nothing so innocent that it has not sometime, and some-
where, been taboo.
It seems that the code of ethics for the legal profession is no ex-
ception to the rule. The Illinois Supreme Court has just held that
the Chicago Motor Club was guilty of contempt of court because
it was practicing law without a license, in that it undertook, as part
of its service to members, to furnish attorneys to represent mem-
bers in court in arrest and in property damage cases.71
If this "fundamental principle" is so inexorable that it requires
the court to condemn as a matter of law a practice which it does
not condemn from the standpoint of social utility, it seems time
to re-examine the principle.7 2
With group hospitalization and group insurance common features of
modern life, with cooperative marketing and purchasing in many areas
of business and economics, with investment trusts adapting the cor-
porate or group principle to the needs of the small and casual investor,
and even, by a not inappropriate analogy, with the growth of the con-
cept of condominium in modern property law, it is clear that group
activity or group-held and group-affected rights are fundamentals of
contemporary American life. The ultimate significance of the Brother-
hood rule will only be discernible when it has brought about a restate-
ment of the professional rationale related to Canon 35 (aet. 1928) and
Canon 47 (aet. 1937). 73
69. Cf. Symposium, supra note 29. See also the several short papers on The Availability
of Legal Services, 51 A.B.A.J. 1064 (1965), which include a brief description of the Cali-
fornia State Bar Association study.
70. Weihofen, Practice of Law by Motor Clubs-Useful But Forbidden, 3 U. CHi. L.
RFv. 296 (1936). The case is People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. The Chicago Motor Club,
362 Il1. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935).
71. Weihofen, supra note 70, at 296.
72. Id. at 300.
73. Cf. the statement in the report on the California Bar Association study: "The pro-
fession should move ahead of the rest of society, rather than try to maintain the status
quo in the face of the demand and the need for substantial change." 51 A.B.A.J. 1068
(1965).
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III. COUNSEL FOR THE INDIGENT: A NEED
FOR GREATER ARTICULATION
The other side of the coin reveals the individual in the corporate
society, almost chronically on the verge of some criminal or civil liti-
gation. Where he is an indigent defendant, the recent tenor of adjudi-
cation, climaxed by Gideon v. Wainwright,74 has developed an elab-
orate series of propositions of professional responsibility which contrast
with the muted, if not downright negative, statement in Canon 4.75
Where the indigent individual is a party to a civil action, there is an
even briefer and more cryptic phrase in Canon 12,76 although a half-
century of growth in the legal aid movement has been a case of actions
speaking louder than words. The Economic Opportunity Act of 196477
established, as part of the "War on Poverty," a Legal Services Program
within the Office of Economic Opportunity to provide legal counseling
services to members of low-income groups, often through private law
offices situated in the low-income areas.78 Perhaps even more impor-
tant has been the effect of the "War on Poverty" in awakening the lay
public to the fact that the rights which now may be more effectively
asserted for the impoverished are actually rights which they have al-
ways had under common and statute law. As Attorney-General Katzen-
bach has observed:
There are large numbers of poor people who discover that they
have a binding obligation to pay a finance company for furniture
never delivered or for a TV set that never worked. There are large
numbers whose cars or washing machines are repossessed after
months of payments-who have no idea they are entitled to the
return of their equity. There are large numbers whose public as-
sistance is reduced or revoked-who have no concept of their rights
of appeal.
To be sure, these are not new problems. It is our appreciation
of them that is new. There has been long and devoted service to
the legal problems of the poor by Legal Aid societies and Public
Defenders in many cities; but, without disrespect to this important
work, we cannot translate our new concern into successful action
simply by providing more of the same. There must be new tech-
74. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
75. "A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be
excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf."
76. "A client's ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess of the value of the service,
though his poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all."
77. 78 Stat. 508, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (1964).
78. See Shriver, The OEO and Legal Services, 51 A.B.A.J. 1064 (1965).
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niques, new services, and new forms of inter-professional coopera-
tion to match our new interest.79
There may be a lurking prospect of conflict between the "new forms
of interprofessional cooperation" and the old debate over lay associates
and intermediaries. One is reminded, on the one hand, of the 1939
Opinion 191 of the ABA condemning the effort of a group of lawyers
to make low-cost legal counseling available to needy persons through
advertisements and through local welfare organizations" and, on the
other, of the warning in the 1964 report of the Standing Committee
on Legal Aid and'Indigent Defendants concerning "the indifference,
fear, and, at times, hostility expressed by the poor toward the law gen-
erally and its administration through our adversary system." 8' Yet, chal-
lenging new ideas are being advanced in response to the broadening
social demands for legal assistance for indigents in both civil and crim-
inal areas; one is the recruiting and training of "subprofessionals" in
the legal profession comparable to the medical profession's reserve
forces of technicians and other specialists. "It seems clear already," says
a leader of the Missouri bar, "that many routine operations in the legal
profession could be performed competently by laymen working under
the supervision of lawyers."82 Aware of the unpalatability of such a
proposal, the speaker admonished the bar that its job is
to face straightforwardly the facts as they exist and not as we wish
they might be. It is to consider all ideas, even the unpopular ones,
especially if they offer any promise of satisfying the public's un-
filled need for legal services. It is, in short, to live, to think and to
act in the world of today and tomorrow-not in the nostalgia of
yesterday. 3
Aid to the indigent in the area of civil cases is manifestly on the
threshold of a substantial development, along lines as yet not discern-
ible. In the area of criminal justice, matters have been accelerated by
the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,84 although the degree
of realism in the fee schedule and the omission of a plan for public
defenders in the federal courts have been obvious targets of criticism.
79. Katzenbach, Extending Legal Services to the Poor, 23 LEGAL Am BRIEF CASE 148,
150 (1965).
80. It should be pointed out that the opinion concluded by recommending establish-
ment of a free legal clinic or advertisement by a bar association rather than by indi-
vidually named attorneys.
81. Report of the Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work, 89 A.B.A. REP. 506 (1964).
82. McCalpin, Meeting the Challenge, 51 A.B.A.J. 1068, 1069 (1965).
83. Ibid.
84. 78 Stat. 552 (1964), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (Supp. 1965).
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Another problem derives from the tendency of both bench and bar to
ignore the fact that a great many practicing attorneys have virtually no
criminal law experience; when appointed as counsel in the deliberately
random process which has the superficial appearance of being equitable
and objective, such lawyers in conceivable situations would prove more
of a burden than a benefit to the client. One method of alleviating this
difficulty appears to be the expansion of the legal aid agencies, where
they exist, to include areas of criminal law with their traditional em-
phasis on civil cases-either in cooperation with private practitioners
appointed as counsel to indigents, or with offices of public defenders
where these exist.8 5
With the ABA Special Committee currently at work on the general
reassessment of the Canons of Professional Ethics, any specific sugges-
tions for modernization would perhaps be premature except as a con-
tribution to the dialogue from which will presumably come, in the
Committee's final report, a text for new or revised rules of conduct.
The Committee must, like a legislative body enacting amendatory leg-
islation, consider each specific change in the light of its effect on the
corpus of the .rules generally; moreover, in the case of the particular
problems set out in the foregoing paragraphs, it must weigh the lessons
of research and experience-e.g., the inequities of bail practices vis-&-
vis indigent accused parties, 6 or the successes and shortcomings of
neighborhood legal services,87 and the vacuum existing in procedural
law generally which has been identified in the record of the public
defender system.88 With these qualifications and cautions, however, the
following suggestions are made with a view to inviting professional
attention to the possibilities for reform of those Canons which have
been specifically criticized in this paper.
Canon 4 manifestly 'requires comprehensive revision and broad-
ening, not only to accommodate the new safeguards of rights of the
accused underlined by recent judicial decisions, but in the process to
85. Cf. Woodruff & Falco, The Defender Workshop: A Clinical Experiment in Criminal
Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 283 (1966).
86. See Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the
Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. R1 v. 67 (1963); Carter, The Criminal Justice Act of
1964, 86 F.R.D. 67 (1964); Proceedings of the Conference on Bail and Indigency, 1965 ILL.
L.F. 1 (1965).
87. See Symposium, Legal Services for the Poor, 49 Mass. L.Q. 293 (1964); Abraham,
25 Years of Service: Philadelphia's Neighborhood Law Office Plan, 50 A.B.A.J. 728 (1964);
Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YArE L.J. 1317 (1964);
Parker, The New Haven Neighborhood Model, 23 LEGAL Am BRmF CASE 164 (1965);
Wells, The Boston Neighborhood Program, 23 LEGAL Am BRmF CAsE 158 (1965).
88. See Segal, Some Procedural and Strategic Inequities in Defending the Indigent, 51
A.B.A.J. 1165 (1965).
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protect the attorney from unfair aspersions cast upon his competence.
It is becoming almost a commonplace in some jurisdictions, in cases
usually, although not always, of assigned counsel, for defendants, upon
being convicted, to seek relief through original writs alleging lack of
skill or diligence on the part of their lawyers. The question of what
should constitute minimum standards of professional skill and dili-
gence is difficult at best and subjective at worst.89 The manifest lack
of familiarity with criminal law procedure and rationale, which derives
from the fact that so many lawyers deliberately avoid such cases in prac-
tice, provides a general ground of credibility for complaints of mal-
practice lodged against counsel by convicted parties; but it is no answer,
in this age of progressively more complex responsibilities, to reiter-
ate the traditional admonition that a lawyer is chargeable with knowl-
edge of general rules of practice in all areas of law normally considered
in the process of admitting him to the bar.90
As a first step toward clarifying the profession's responsibility in the
general area of criminal justice, it is suggested that the ABA Canons
4 and 5 both be supplanted by a more specific text modeled after
Canons 3 and 4 of the Code of Trial Conduct of the American College
of Trial Lawyers.91 Because these are not as universally available as the
ABA Canons, they are quoted verbatim .herewith:
IIl. EMPLOYMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES
A lawyer should not decline to undertake the defense of a per-
son accused of crime, regardless of his personal or the community's
opinion as to the guilt of the accused or the unpopularity of the
accused's position, because every person accused of a crime has a
right to a fair trial, including persons whose conduct, reputation
or alleged violations may be the subject of public unpopularity or
clamor. This places a duty of service on the legal profession and,
even though a lawyer is not bound to accept particular employ-
ment, requests for service in criminal cases should not lightly be
declined or refused merely on the basis of the lawyer's personal
desires, his or public opinion concerning the guilt of the accused,
or his repugnance to the crime charged or to the accused.
IV. CONTINUANCE OF EMPLOYMENT IN AND
CONDUCT OF CRIMINAL CASES
(a) Having accepted employment in a criminal case, a lawyer's
duty, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused,
89. See, e.g., the facts of the case and the language of the dissent in Conway v. Sauk
County, 19 Wis. 2d 599, 120 N.W.2d 671 (1963). See also Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531 (1963).
90. See generally Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755
(1959).
91. See notes 16, 17 8: 18 supra.
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is to invoke the basic rule that the crime must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by competent evidence, to raise all valid defenses
and, in case of conviction, to present all proper grounds for pro-
bation or in mitigation of punishment. A confidential disclosure
of guilt alone does not require a withdrawal from the case. How-
ever, after a confidential disclosure of facts clearly and credibly
showing guilt, a lawyer should not present any evidence inconsis-
tent with such facts. He should never offer testimony which he
knows to be false.
(b) The crime charged should not be attributed to another
identifiable person unless evidence introduced or inferences war-
ranted therefrom raise at least a reasonable suspicion of such per-
son's probable guilt.
(c) The prosecutor's primary duty is not to convict but to see
that justice is done. Evidence which appears credible and which
clearly tends to prove the accused's innocence should not be sup-
pressed.
However, these canons standing alone do not cover the subject com-
pletely; indeed, they make no specific allusion to the responsibilities of
counsel appointed to defend an indigent accused. ABA Canon 4, ac-
cordingly, needs to be more positively improved: (1) by a statement
which recognizes such problems as the need for and availability of
counsel at the preliminary hearing, and in all stages of pretrial proce-
dure; 92 (2) by taking into consideration the fact that practical and equi-
table opportunities for bail and for psychiatric services are part of the
requirements for full justice to all accused persons whether indigent
or not;93 and (3) by the definition of counsel's responsibilities after
judgment in a trial resulting in conviction.9"
Even assuming adoption of new or revised canons, such as those from
the Code of Trial Conduct quoted above, it seems essential that a new
Canon concerning counsel for indigents be drafted to round out the
statement of professional responsibilities in the field of criminal law.
Such a Canon may indeed have to be phrased in anticipation of its pro-
gressive amendment as experience in this area develops-particularly
as state legislative remedies are effected in the light of recent judicial
decision and congressional action.95 Indeed, the ultimate Canon on in-
digent counsel is almost impossible to write in the absence of statutory
changes in the criminal procedure of many jurisdictions; it is suggested,
however, that eventually a statement somewhat like the following may
be possible:
92. Segal, supra note 88, at 1166-67.
93. Id. at 1167.
94. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963.)
95. Cf. Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
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THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ACCUSED INDIGENTS
While any attorney appointed as counsel for an indigent accused
ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, an appointed
counsel may properly call attention to, and the court should take
into consideration, (a) the practical importance of experience and
knowledgeability in criminal practice in providing the accused
with adequate professional assistance; and (b) the reasonable
amount of time and funds required for the preparation of an in-
digent's case. Upon appointment, an attorney who is unfamiliar
with criminal practice should be encouraged by the court and the
local bar to seek advice and if necessary active association in the
case from brother lawyers who are experienced in criminal law.
Where the services of a legal aid agency are available, and/or
where private psychiatric interviewing is part of the allowable ex-
penses of the defense taxable to the public funds, an appointed
counsel should take full advantage of these services.
Inasmuch as the availability of trained and qualified profes-
sional assistance is essential to the safeguarding of the rights of
accused persons, but since in the nature of things such assistance
cannot be provided until the need for it is brought to the court's
attention, it inevitably follows that appointed counsel enters such
a case after numerous preliminaries to prosecution are well ad-
vanced. It is proper for appointed counsel to petition the court to
bar any evidence obtained from any direct or indirect interroga-
tion of the accused in his absence, and to seek the institution of
preliminary procedure de novo if, in his opinion, there has been
inadequate safeguarding of the accused's constitutional rights. But
counsel for the accused in no case should indulge in gratuitous
accusation of arresting or prosecuting officers, and only upon sub-
mission of competent evidence of anything prejudicial to a defen-
dant's rights should counsel raise the issue before the court.
The responsibility of appointed counsel in seeking appellate
review of an adverse judgment is the same as that of any lawyer re-
tained by a defendant able to pay for the appeal and the services
of counsel. Where in forma pauperis proceedings are not provided
for in the local jurisdiction, appointed counsel cannot be required
by any standards of professional responsibility to prosecute an ap-
peal to his own impoverishment; but in any case and at all times,
the attorney as an individual citizen and as a member of his local
and/or state bars should take an active part in seeking appropriate
legislative remedies to insure that rights of accused persons gener-
ally shall be equally available to the indigent accused, and that
reasonable reimbursement for all costs required in a criminal de-
fense of an indigent shall be provided by statute or by rule of
court.
The present writer does not pretend that the foregoing text is ac-
ceptable in its present form; it is, rather, an invitation to proposals for
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revision and supplement. In the same vein, Canon 35 warrants amend-
ment-in the first paragraph, in the light of the developing legislative
concern with the rights of indigent civil litigants, and in the second
paragraph, in the light of changing social convictions as to the prac-
tical benefits of legal services made available through groups or asso-
ciations. As for Canon 47, to the extent that the organized bar becomes
adamant in its position on unauthorized practice of law, there are al-
ready warning signs that adversely affected interests may successfully
challenge the position.9 6 Confining the present recommendations for
reform to the existing text of Canon 35, therefore, the following is sub-
mitted for the consideration of the profession:
The concluding sentence in the first paragraph of the present Canon
35 reads "Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not
deemed . . . intermediaries." Thi' is well and good, but it would
appear desirable to enlarge upon this proposition by inserting, between
the present two paragraphs of the Canon, a new second paragraph per-
haps reading as follows:
The bar has a responsibility for insuring equal opportunities to
indigents to secure their rights in civil as well as in criminal
causes, and to this end the individual attorney and the local bar
should encourage and assist all public and private efforts to facili-
tate legal services to indigents or to persons who are members of
low-income groups. An attorney should make every reasonable
effort to accommodate any request for his own professional ser-
vices where his particular competence or the policy of his local
bar has prompted the legal aid agency to seek his participation
in a particular case or for a specified period of time. The attorney
as individual citizen and as a member of his local and/or state bar
should work actively for the establishment and adequate support
of legal aid agencies and offices by private or public initiative and
finance.
To enhance the implementation of the objectives suggested by the
foregoing text, it may also be desirable to amend Canon 47, inter alia,
by adding a sentence to this general effect: "The services of advanced
law students, where permitted by the statutes or rules of court of the
local jurisdiction and where supervised by the students' law school
and/or members of the local bar, when used as an auxiliary to the
prosecution of an indigent's rights either civil or criminal, shall not
be deemed the unauthorized practice of law."
96. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); State Bar v. Arizona
Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961). See also the overriding constitu-
tional amendment following the Arizona decision. Auiz. CONST., Art. XXVI.
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In any event, it is the present concluding paragraph of Canon 35
which is of primary importance-to a limited extent, perhaps, with
reference to legal aid to indigents but, to a major degree, with refer-
ence to the issue developed in the Brotherhood case. To what extent
Canons 27 and 28, as well as Canon 47, may require modification if
and as this last paragraph of Canon 35 is modified, perhaps may be
left out of consideration for the moment. The probability of a neces-
sary modifying of this portion of Canon 35, however, in the light of
the Brotherhood case and the eloquent report of the committee of the
California State Bar Association,9 7 has prompted the suggested text
which follows. For purposes of typographic clarity, the existing para-
graph is reprinted in italics, with editorial changes in brackets and
the supplementary text in roman type.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such
as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal ser-
vices in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is
interested[.] [T]his employment should not include the rendering
of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect
to their individual affairs[,] except under circumstances which pre-
serve to the greatest reasonable degree the personal relationships
between an attorney and a client. The public interest in provid-
ing expert legal service to individuals who are members of a group,
by virtue of the interests, consequences or responsibilities deriving
from membership in the group, requires an adequate and appro-
priate response on the part of the bar to the needs of both the
public and the individual.
The availability of the services of counsel occasionally or regu-
larly retained by an organized group, to accommodate the needs
of members of the group deriving from the interests, consequences
or responsibilities of their membership in the group, should be
-conditioned by these considerations, inter alia: (a) The group
should be a bona fide organization for purposes other than the sole
one of providing legal services to its members; (b) It should not
exercise any control over the attorney's performance of his pro-
fessional services, nor should it require any division of fees re-
ceived by the attorney from the member for services performed
on behalf of the individual member; and (c) Where any conflict
of interest may be in prospect, either within the provisions of
Canon 6 or from the circumstances of the attorney's relationship
to the group, the attorney has the right and the duty to withdraw
from the employment of the one client or the other and there-
after to refrain from subsequent service to the remaining client
97. See the text of the report in 39 J. STATE BAR CAL. 639 (1964). In May 1965 the state
bar's board of governors rejected the recommendations in the report. See 51 A.B.A.J. 1068
(1965).
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which improperly takes advantage of his knowledge of the affairs
of the former client.
To concede that the provisions in the foregoing suggested text require
a number of further refinements is to reiterate the practical difficulty
of reconciling the established (one might be tempted to say, en-
trenched) position of the bar and the mounting pressure of lay public
opinion augmented by the rationale in the Brotherhood case.
In any event, the need for a comprehensive restatement of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility (if, in the process, a new title
could be introduced as well) is peculiarly emphasized by the develop-
ments in the Brotherhood case, in the right-to-counsel cases, and in
the Economic Opportunity Act and Criminal Justice Act, both of
which were passed in the same year. The challenge of modernization
is aptly stated in the comments to the 1965 ABA convention by the
chairman of the Special Committee on the Availability of Legal Ser-
vices; the questions of group legal services and available legal aid for
indigents demand affirmative answers and "carry a common warning:
that our fellow citizens may not be satisfied with the rendition of legal
services in the form, by the organizations, at the cost or on the bases
that the legal profession now provides them."98
98. McCalpin, supra note 82, at 1068.
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